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Abstract
Utilizing an event study methodology, this paper studies the effect that mergers and
acquisitions (M&A) announcements have on media acquirors’ stock returns. This study
also examines the effect that various characteristics of the target and acquiror have on
acquirors’ returns. These characteristics include: location of the acquired company, year
of the acquisition, industry of the acquired company, price of the acquired company, size
of the acquiror, and serial acquiror status of the acquiror. My findings are consistent with
previous literature that find that, in a short-term event window surrounding the
announcement of a merger or acquisition, acquirors experience returns that are not
significantly different from zero, on average. Additionally, my results indicate that an
increased acquiror size corresponds with a predicted increase in acquiror returns and that
acquisitions of media companies correspond with a predicted decrease in acquiror
returns.
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Ⅰ. Introduction
With increased competition and globalization, it is getting increasingly difficult
for companies in mature markets to carve out market share and grow through organic
strategies. This is especially true for the media and entertainment industry. Because
entertainment content is so subjective and rooted in consumer preference, the industry is
constantly forced to assess and evolve to stay relevant. In recent years, primary trends are
the increased importance of technological capabilities, the emergence of streaming
services, and the aggressive acquisition of content.1 These industry drivers make
acquisitions aimed at these areas particularly attractive to firms in the space.
There is a gap in literature concerning whether American media companies’
acquisitions are creating value and what factors are significantly related to the creation of
value. Given the aforementioned industry shifts and the significant market success of
companies like Disney and Netflix have recently experienced, this paper will explore
how much, if any, value that media mergers have for the acquiror. In addition to
determining if acquiring firms recognize financial value from an acquisition,
characteristics of both the acquired company and acquiror are examined to better
understand the variation in acquiror returns.
I utilize an event study methodology to determine value created by mergers over
the past two decades. By calculating the cumulative abnormal return for an acquiring
company in a short time window around the announcement of a merger, the market’s
reaction to the event can be quantified. I also regress various factors that are

“Standing out from the crowd: How media and entertainment companies can use M&A to secure the
content, customers and capabilities they need to differentiate” Deloitte Insights Case Study, 2020
1
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hypothesized to affect the market’s reaction to the acquisition such as the target’s
industry and country of origin, deal price, acquiror’s size, serial acquiror status of the
acquiror, and year that the acquisition occurred in against the cumulative abnormal
return.
On average, I discovered that there is not a significant return for acquiring firms
in the media and entertainment industry. At the p-value of less than 0.20 level, there was
a small slightly negative cumulative abnormal return that arose during the short-term
merger window. The factors studied had various levels of significance, depending on the
model utilized and number of observations available with the data. In Model Ⅺ, size of
the acquiror had a statistically significant (p-value < 0.05) positive impact on acquiror
returns. In Model ⅪⅠ, media purchases were found to have a statistically significant
negative impact on acquiror returns.
A. Literature Review
This literature review focuses on previous papers that analyze mergers and
acquisitions using an event study methodology to study merger announcements.
Additionally, I provide an overview of the recent changes in the media and entertainment
industry and the factors that may be associated with the uptick in merger activity in the
industry.2
A.1. M&A Literature
Given the frequency of acquisitions despite very high failure rate that some
estimate to be between 70% and 90%,3 studying the value creation from M&A is
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Refer to Chart Ⅰ
“The New M&A Playbook” Christensen, Alton, Rising, Waldeck, Harvard Business Review, March 2011
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essential to understanding why firms continue to acquire and what benefits they receive.
Before getting into how to measure this, it’s essential to understand why firms acquire
and what outcomes acquisitions create.
Given that mergers and acquisitions have been happening since the creation of
businesses, there is significant literature focused on examining M&A performance. Das
and Kapil (2012) provided a review of empirical research that serves as a solid
foundation for my research. By reviewing 48 different empirical M&A papers (funneled
down from 730 between 1990 and 2010), the authors create a comprehensive review of
past literature. Additionally, they detail how there are large discrepancies between
findings on the success of M&A, despite being an extremely common avenue for growth.
Through this meta-analysis, the dependent variables utilized to measure M&A
success are accounting measures, market-related measures, other objective measures, and
subjective measures. Accounting measures are usually centered around growth or return,
such as ROE and NPV of acquisition to the acquiror. Most market-related measures
utilize a short-term stock performance event study methodology. Other objective
measures feature combined variables related to accounting and event studies or new
measures such as employee growth rate or number of patents granted post-acquisition.
Subjective measures include quality of innovation and satisfaction.
To better understand the underlying reasons for acquisitions, Haleblian et al.
(2009) developed a framework by reviewing 167 empirical studies from 1992 to 2009
focused on quantitative acquisition research. They found the primary reasons for
acquisitions to be value creation, managerial self-interest, environmental factors, and firm
characteristics. The moderators of acquisitions include deal characteristics, managerial
3

effects, firm characteristics, and environmental factors. Outcomes are primarily focused
on performance and include acquisition premiums, turnover, and customer and
bondholder outcomes.
In addition to studying why mergers occur, Dilshad (2013) detailed why mergers
and acquisitions fail, citing flawed strategy and objective clarity, poor integration
planning, cultural differences, lack of experience and knowledge, over-optimism, and a
difficult external environment.
Once understanding why M&A occurs, methods for testing the success were
reviewed. Andrade et al. (2001) details how event studies work and why they are the best
measure for judging the success of M&A. In short-term event studies, “the average
abnormal stock market reaction at merger announcement is used as a gauge of value
creation or destruction.” Per Dilshad (2013), abnormal returns are “the part of the return
that is not predicted by the market index.” Event studies are viewed as valid measures
based upon the assumption that global capital markets are efficient and react quickly
following public information changes such as a merger announcement. Common time
windows are comparing a day or two before and after the announcement of a merger and
one prior to the announcement and one when the transaction closes.
Andrade et al. (2001) found, from 1973-1998, the abnormal returns for the target
when comparing the day before and after announcement date averages 16.0%, while the
acquiror’s abnormal return is -0.7%. This trend survives throughout each decade and
highlights how the market views both the target and acquiror. Additionally, Agrawal et
al. (1992) found that in 765 mergers between 1955 and 1987, acquirors experience
negative cumulative abnormal returns in the medium to long-term (1 month to 60
4

months). Overall, short-term event studies are viewed as better measures for M&A value
judgement than long-term event studies because of confounding events that occur in the
long-run, long-term abnormal performance face difficulties getting statistically
significant results with expected returns over time varying greatly, and the controversial
assumption that abnormal returns are independent across firms.
Next, in line with Andrade et al. (2001), Dutordoir et al. (2020) found that, on
average, the target firm experiences positive abnormal returns at announcement.
However, they found that there has been a significant decline in the magnitude of positive
abnormal returns, decreasing from 10% in the 1980s to 2% after 2010. There are two
explanations for this that are related to different hypotheses about target returns. The deal
anticipation hypothesis assumes legal trading activity drives returns. The insider trading
hypothesis argues illegal trading by insiders drives returns. Dutordoir (2020) tested
whether deal anticipation or changes in deal and firm characteristics impacts the decline
and did not find significant results. However, he found that more stringent insider trading
rules was related to the decline in target abnormal returns, suggesting validity for the
insider trading hypothesis.
For event study methodologies, Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is the
primary tool to test hypotheses. Detailed by Agrawal et al. (1992), there are a few
different methods for calculating cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). These include the
Market model, Market-adjusted Model, Fama French Model, and Carhart Model. Brown
and Warner (1985) found that the different methods for calculating CAR did not have an
effect when the event period is short.
A.2. Media & Entertainment Literature
5

Although there has been a significant amount of research focusing on M&A, there
are very few that specifically cover American media and entertainment companies.
Specifically, there has not been an empirical study examining American companies in the
space in the past 5 years, when there have been several significant media mergers and an
uptick in deals in the movies, music, and entertainment sector.
Given lack of academic empirical studies focusing on media & entertainment,
practitioners reports were utilized to provide a basis for examining M&A in the space
further. Deloitte’s Center for Technology, Media & Telecommunications (2020) released
a report detailing recent trends and the future of M&A in TMT. From 2014 to 2020,
companies had spent more than $700 billion on M&A in media and entertainment. With
massive deals like Walt Disney Co’s acquisition of Twenty First Century Fox and
AT&T’s acquisition of TimeWarner, the industry has rapidly evolved in recent history.
Deloitte detailed the variety of reasons for these high levels of M&A activity and deal
volume.
First, there has been an explosion of content creation, evidenced by the volume of
scripted original TV shows across networks and digital platforms jumping from 216 in
2010 to 532 in 2019. As content booms, so has the popularity of streaming, with 80% of
consumers using at least one streaming service compared to 49% in 2017. As the number
of streaming services continues to increase, there must be a decision point where
consumers decide to focus their spending power on one. This inevitable consolidation is a
large driver of M&A in the space.
Deloitte (2020) utilized their research and insider knowledge to create a list of
three primary M&A implications for media and entertainment companies. First, players
6

will focus on providing differentiated content. As more and more content is released,
quality becomes paramount to securing customer loyalty, driving acquisitions of those
with premium content offerings. Second, firms who provide better streaming services
will win the battle for streaming viewership (via a subscription model). In an effort to
create better service offerings, companies should acquire those with sophisticated
technology and software. Lastly, media and entertainment companies will be
emphasizing the ability to monetize and target consumers. Utilizing acquisitions to
improve data analytics can be a large differentiator in the streaming wars.
Katz (2021) offered further insight into Deloitte’s claims in an article that
emphasizes the reasons why consolidation and M&A are booming in the entertainment
industry. Given the overwhelming number of streaming services and attractiveness of
content aggregation created through M&A, he sees the streaming industry fitting into
four distinct groups. First, there is a premium group for top content and streaming
capabilities. Second, there is a niche group with targeted services towards specific media
consumers. Third, there is a free group that focuses on using subscriptions for alternative
business purposes. Fourth, there is a sports group focusing on providing athletic
coverage. Mike Chapman, Partner and Americas Media Lead at Kearney, believes that
streaming services will consolidate to form three to five major services and one or two
niche services.
Although limited, there are some empirically based studies focusing on the media
and entertainment sector. Thomas et al. (2020) utilized financial ratios pre and postmerger to analyze five entertainment company mergers, with a majority based in India.
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Through studying two years before and two years after acquisition, it was found that the
acquisition did not have a significant impact on their financial performance.
M&A in the growing South Korean entertainment and media industry has also
been studied. N. Kim and J.H. Kim (2020) utilized a reliable event study methodology
and found that acquirors earn approximately 8% CAR twenty days prior to announcement
and 4% average abnormal return on the announcement date. This finding indicates that
M&A slightly benefits acquiror share prices and signals positive investor sentiment in the
entertainment and media industry.
Rheaume and Bhabra (2008) found that between 1993 and 2005, there was
positive wealth change for acquirors in “information-based industries”. These industries
include telecommunications, computing, entertainment, electronics, and publications.
These findings contrast with the general M&A literature that states that there is generally
zero or negative wealth change for acquiring firms, when utilizing a short-term event
study methodology. This study gives rise to a possible special quality about technology
and/or entertainment companies that might be a determinant of a positive abnormal return
for acquirors.
Lastly, a senior thesis completed at Claremont McKenna College found that
media and entertainment acquirors did not earn returns that are statistically significant
from 0, on average when studying 85 deals between 1998 and 2014 (Abdul-Rahim
(2015)).
A.3. Theory and Hypotheses
My research attempts to answer questions surrounding the effect of M&A on
American media and entertainment companies. The primary two questions that will be
8

examined empirically are: (1) What are the announcement effects for acquirors in the
American media and entertainment industry? (2) What factors about the acquiror and
acquired (target) company affect the announcement effect? All hypotheses are referring
to the market announcement effect on returns for acquirors.
Hypothesis 1: The market announcement effect for acquirors in the American
media and entertainment industry will be negative or zero, on average.
Andrade et al. (2001), Agrawal et al. (1992), and Healy et al. (1992) found that
acquiror’s earn insignificant returns in short term event windows following acquisition
announcements. Despite some conflicting research for non-American companies,
mentioned in the literature review, this is hypothesized to be the same case in my study of
American media and entertainment companies.
Hypothesis 2: The announcement effect will be, on average, positive when the
acquired company is headquartered outside of the United States. The effect will be
opposite for acquired companies headquartered in the United States.
Peltier (2004) discovered that internationalization of media companies was
positively correlated with positive economic and operational performance in a study of 11
media companies in 1998 and 1999. Similar results are expected in this study when
reviewing the market effect rather than a firm-level efffect.
Hypothesis 3: The announcement effect will vary based on industry of the
acquired company. Specifically, acquirors that purchase software companies will realize
positive announcement effects and those that purchase media companies will realize zero
or negative effects, on average. All other industries examined will realize negative or
zero returns following announcement, in line with Hypothesis 1.
9

Rheaume and Bhabra (2008) found that acquiring firms in different industries had
different effects on returns for the acquiror. Specifically, they found that acquisitions of
entertainment companies did not have significant effects, but telecommunications,
electronics, information content, and information highways companies were associated
with a positive change in cumulative abnormal returns. This finding, along with prior
knowledge of software company stock growth in the past decade, led me to hypothesize
that software acquisitions would generate positive returns.
Hypothesis 4: The announcement effect will be negatively related to the price
paid for the target.
Discussed by Dong et al. (2006), higher target valuations are associated with
equity rather than cash offers. In a sample of 3732 deals from 1978 to 2000, transactions
using equity were found to have negative returns surrounding announcement. One
possible reason for this is the overvaluation hypothesis, that asserts a company will use
equity for a transaction because it believes its stock is overvalued. Another is the basic
principle of overpayment: many acquisitions fail due to overpayment and higher target
valuations may signal overpayment. Lastly, a company paying a larger price for an
acquisition may signal to the market that they have exhausted all organic growth
opportunities, discovered by Jovanovic and Braguinsky (2002).
Hypothesis 5: The announcement effect will be positive, on average, for media
companies classified as serial acquirors, relative to non-serial acquirors.
Cihan and Tice (2014) found that acquirors who were diversified companies had
higher acquisition announcement returns than acquirors who were business line focused
in a 1678 deal sample between 1980 and 2010 across industries. The highly acquisitive
10

firms in my sample, such as Disney and Live Nation Entertainment, are diversified
companies with multiple business lines, making me hypothesize they might generate
positive returns, relative to less-diversified players. Additionally, serial acquirors may
generate more positive returns due to the general psychological and economic theory that
actors act in their best self-interest and if a company continually had acquisition failures
it would probably stop acquiring more companies.
Hypothesis 6: The announcement effect will be, on average, negative for larger
acquirors compared to smaller acquirors.
Moeller et al. (2003) that found there to be a significant size effect, with
acquisitions by smaller acquirors generating returns 2% greater than larger acquirors, on
average. Peltier (2004) also found that a media firm’s size in an acquisition was
negatively correlated with economic performance, measured by profit margin. I expect a
similar result to occur for my data set of media and entertainment companies when
testing how acquiror size affects CAR.
Hypothesis 7: There will be no statistically significant effect of time (in years) on
acquiror returns.
There is no applicable evidence to suggest that recency of M&A would have a
statistically significant effect on cumulative abnormal returns. Years are used as a control
variable.
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Ⅱ. Data Description
A. Sample Selection
My analysis focused on M&A that occurred between 2000 and 2020 that featured
American media company acquirors. This time period was chosen because it is long
enough to analyze differences over time, has a large enough sample of acquisitions, and
is recent enough to capture important trends in the industry.
I utilized Pitchbook to filter my search for deals. The Pitchbook database has
significant data on acquisitions with breakdowns by industry that is judged as reliable due
to daily updating and popularity of the resource in financial services. I underwent a stepby-step filter process to ensure I found the data set that would be applicable to my
research questions. First, I limited the list to only deals with publicly traded American
acquirors to ensure that stock data would be available to generate a cumulative abnormal
return. Second, I limited deal types to only include M&A control transactions where the
acquiror was the lead or sole investor. This solidified that an acquisition was the event
rather than other types of deals such as corporate divestitures or reverse mergers. Third,
and most importantly, I narrowed my search to include only acquirors in the “movies,
music and entertainment” sub-sector.4 Pitchbook has a robust filtering process that
categorizes primary industry group, primary industry sector, verticals, and primary
industry code or sub-sector. I filtered down to the primary industry code to avoid getting
firms that were not the focus of my research such as technology companies, information
services companies, and publishing companies.

In this paper, when referring to “media” or “entertainment” companies, I am referencing companies who
operate in the movies, music, and entertainment sub-sector, as defined by Pitchbook.
4
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After filtering these criteria, and then using WRDS Event Study methodology to
ensure data availability, 195 separate M&A deals were found since January 1st, 2000.
These deals served as my primary data set to analyze. The additional information that I
contracted through Pitchbook are announcement date, primary industry group and code,
target headquarters location, and acquiror enterprise value. Deal price was also provided,
but only for a limited number (N=92) of deals. A full deal list is provided at the end of
the Appendix, in Table ⅪⅠⅠ.
B. Data Summary
A key facet to recognize for the data set utilized is the lack of public target firms.
This relates to a unique component of the movies, music, and entertainment sector that I
am researching; there are very few large public companies that dominate the space and
frequently buy up smaller private companies to grow. Of the 195 total deals studied, none
featured a publicly traded target company. This created limitations in calculating the total
value of the acquisition, which would require calculating target cumulative abnormal
returns.
An essential part of the success of an acquisition is the timing and market
environment of the new combined company. My data indicated that a majority of deals in
the space have occurred in the last five years. Because there is 21 years of data, quartiles
were calculated based on 5.25-year time periods, or 5 year and 3 months. Of the 195 total
deals, 11 occurred between January 2000 and March 2005 (6%), 58 occurred in the next
five and a quarter year (30%), 50 occurred in the five and a quarter year following that
(26%), and 76 deals occurred in the most recent five and a quarter year (39%). The most
acquisitions in one year occurred in 2019, where there were 21 deals in the space. This
13

information provides validity to the nature of my research due to an increase in
acquisitions in the market recently.
Second, global region information was provided and analyzed. Target firms
headquartered in the Americas were the large majority, with 137 companies, good for
70% of the sample. Second was Europe with 45 companies and 23% of the sample. Asia
had 8 deals or 4% of the sample. Both the Middle East and Oceania had 2 deals each, or
1% of the sample. Africa had 1 company or .5% of the total sample. Results are visible in
Table Ⅲ.
Next, analyzing target industry sectors yielded very interesting descriptive results.
The largest target sector was media, with 73 acquired firms being categorized as such
(37%). The next three largest were Commercial Services with 51 (26%), Software with
33 (17%), and Restaurants, Hotels, and Leisure with 13 (7%). All other industries had 4
or less companies, which corresponded to 2% of the total sample or less. Results are
visible in Table Ⅱ.
Lastly, interesting finding was the number of total acquirors in the sample. The
data set was limited by time rather than acquiror, so multiple acquisitions from the same
acquiror was possible. The 195 deals studied yielded only 24 acquirors. This hints at the
fact that the M&A space in the industry is dominated by a few large hyper-acquisitive
public players rather than a large number of companies who rarely pursue acquisitions.
Of the 24 acquirors, 11 were found to be what I am categorizing as “serial acquirors”. I
classified a company as a serial acquiror if it had acquired 5 or more companies in the
past two decades. This sample was top heavy, with the 4 most acquisitive firms each
having more than 10 acquisitions in the past 20 years. Live Nation Entertainment (LYV)
14

led the way with 63 acquisitions, good for 32% of the total sample. Second, was the Walt
Disney Company (DIS) with 38 acquisitions or 19% of the total sample. Third was Avid
Technology (AVID) with 14 acquisitions or 7% of the total sample. The fourth serial
acquiror was Viad Corporation (VVI) with 12 acquisitions or 6% of the total acquisitions
during the time period. Results are visible in Table Ⅰ.
C. Cumulative Abnormal Returns Data
To calculate the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the acquiring firms, I
utilized Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). WRDS has an event study
methodology software that allows one to input specific parameters and data regarding an
event to generate CARs.
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Ⅲ. Event Study Methodology
Using WRDS software, I chose an estimation window of 100 days, a minimum
number of valid returns at 70, a gap of 50 days between the estimation and event window,
and an event window of two days prior to two days after announcement [-2,2]. These
criteria were selected to ensure that cumulative abnormal returns were calculated
correctly with available information on expected and abnormal returns in the time period
determined by the announcement date. A [-2,2] event window was chosen to avoid any
auxiliary factors that may affect the abnormal returns further before or after the
acquisition. Calculating using 2 days before and after, rather than only 1 day, also allows
there to be some leakage of information prior to announcement and some small lag in
market reaction included in the calculation. This is consistent with literature on shortterm event studies.
CARs were originally calculated using 4 different models: Market Model,
Market-Adjusted Model, Fama French Three Factor Model, and Fama French Plus
Momentum Model. In line with Brown and Warner (1985), no model yielded drastically
different results from the rest, but the Fama French Three Factor Plus Momentum Model
as defined by Carhart (1997) was utilized for the CARs because it had the most
statistically significant results. The Fama French Plus Momentum Model expands upon
the basic CAPM Market model to include market, style, size, and momentum factors,
providing a more accurate calculation of abnormal returns. Utilizing this model to
calculate abnormal returns is as follows
𝐴𝑅 = 𝑅 − 𝐸(𝑅) = 𝑅 − (𝑅𝑓 + 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ (𝑅𝑚 − 𝑅𝑓) + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝐵 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝐻𝑀𝐿 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑀𝑂𝑀)
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where AR is abnormal return, R is the actual return, E(R) is the expected return, Rf is the
risk-free rate, Rm-Rf is the market risk premium, SMB is the difference between the
return of a portfolio of small stocks minus the return of a portfolio of large stocks (i.e.
size factor), HML is the return difference between cheap and expensive stocks, calculated
based upon a portfolio with a high book-to market (B/M) ratio minus a low B/M portfolio
(i.e. the value factor), and MOM is the average return of two high prior return portfolios
minus the average return on the two low prior return portfolios.(i.e. the momentum
factor). Abnormal returns are calculated each day of the event window and summed on
day = +2 to determine the cumulative abnormal return for the company.
A Cross-Sectional T Test is utilized to test the significance of the event study,
where the null hypothesis of the cross-sectional t test is that the mean of cumulative
abnormal returns does not differ significantly from zero.
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Ⅳ. Results
A. Event Study
The first results to analyze and interpret are the abnormal returns for the
acquirors. Table Ⅳ reveals the results of the event study and supports Hypothesis 1 in
displaying that acquiror announcement effects are not statistically significant from zero,
on average.
There was a slight majority in deals that yielded negative cumulative abnormal
returns, with 105 of 195 or 54% of acquirors. 90 deals (46%) yielded positive cumulative
abnormal returns for the acquiror. However, with a cross-sectional t-score of -1.37 and pvalue of .172, none of the cumulative abnormal returns was found to be statistically
significant from zero at the 0.05 level. The mean of the cumulative abnormal returns was
-0.59%, with a large variance leading to a standard error of .44%. The minimum CAR
was -32.4% and the maximum was 21.3%.
B. Continuous Variable Assignment
There were a variety of factors that were considered and tested to find out the
impact on the acquiror’s CAR. The continuous variables that were regressed against the
cumulative abnormal returns are detailed below.
Deal Price: For 92 of the 195 deals, data was available via Pitchbook on the deal
price or deal size. This is the total price paid for the target at time of acquisition. A
natural log was taken of this variable for help in interpretation (“Ln Deal Size”).
Acquiror Size: The enterprise value of the acquiror at time of acquisition was
also recorded and regressed against the CARs. In line with the rest of my study, data was
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obtained through Pitchbook. A natural log was taken of this variable for help in
interpretation (“Ln Acquiror Size”).
Years: A time effect was considered also. Data ranged from year 2000 to 2020.
These yearly values were regressed against the CARs.
C. Dummy Variable Assignment
In order to effectively complete a linear regression analysis with interpretation
possibilities, given available data, dummy or binary variables were created. These factors
were regressed against the cumulative abnormal returns generated from the first part of
the study. Dummy variable assignments are visible in Table Ⅴ.
Global Region: The global region variable was split into 6 areas: Africa,
Americas, Asia, Europe, Middle East, and Oceania. For the purpose of the study, targets
headquartered in Americas were given a value of 1, with targets headquartered in all
other territories being given a value of 0.
Industry: The industry variable was originally structured as a categorical
variable. Acquired companies were split into 14 industry sectors. The industries are:
Apparel and Accessories, Capital Markets/Institutions, Commercial Products,
Commercial Services, Communications and Networking, Computer Hardware, Consumer
Durables, Energy Equipment, IT Services, Media, Restaurants/Hotels/Leisure, Retail,
Services (Non-Financial), and Software. To regress each variable with comparative
interpretations, each sub-sector has been given a [1,0] variable designation, with the
value corresponding to a CAR being 1 if the industry matches. More information is given
in the abstract below Table Ⅹ. For my primary regression analysis, I am looking at target
companies in the same industry (media) versus a target company in any other industry.
19

Serial Acquiror: If an acquiror had 5 or more acquisitions in the period since the
beginning of 2000, it was considered a serial acquiror. Serial acquirors were given a
value of 1, where non-serial acquirors were given a value of 0.
D. Determinants of Announcement Effects (Cross-Sectional Regressions)
Following calculations of CARs for the event window surrounding an acquisition
announcement, I regressed the CAR against different characteristics to find if they have
an effect on the acquiror’s announcement effects. To study individual effects, I ran 3
primary sets of models. For each model set, one regression utilized the entire N=195 data
set and an additional regression was run that included deal price and had an N=92. The
first models (Models Ⅰ and Ⅱ) focus only on factors related to the acquiror. The second set
of models (Model Ⅲ and Ⅳ) focus only on factors related to the target. The third and
final model set (Model Ⅴ and Ⅵ) look at how acquiror, target, and market factors impact
the CAR. Overall, the different characteristics analyzed are (1) global region, (2) industry
classification, (3) deal price, (4) time period in years, (5) serial acquiror classification,
and (6) acquiror size.
For the cross-sectional regression analysis, I regressed each variable against the
cumulative abnormal returns. For everything except deal price and acquiror size (which
are continuous variables), I created a dummy variable to test impact on CAR. Each model
regression formula is given below the model title.
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Model Ⅰ: Acquiror Only Factors
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛽1 + 𝐿𝑛𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝛽2 + 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑟𝛽3 + 𝜀𝑖

The first model examined only factors related to the acquiror in the transaction.
The model evaluated the impact of the size of the acquiror and whether the acquiror was
determined to be a serial acquiror. As evident in Table Ⅵ, this model found the size of
the acquiror to be significant at the P < 0.10 level. Holding all else fixed, a 1% increase in
acquiror size is associated with a predicted increase in CAR of .37%. With a p-value of
0.8, I found that, relative to non-serial acquirors, acquisitions by serial acquirors were
related to an increase in CAR of .27%. Given the high p-value, my results reject
Hypothesis 6: that serial acquirors have a positive effect on CAR relative to non-serial
acquirors.

Model Ⅱ: Acquiror Only Factors (including deal price)
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛽1 + 𝐿𝑛𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝛽2 + 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑟𝛽3 + 𝐿𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝛽4 + 𝜀𝑖

When deal price was considered and the number of observations changed from
195 to 92, no statistically significant results were found. Directionally, both acquiror size
and status as a serial acquiror continued to be associated with an increase in CAR.
Results are presented in Table Ⅶ.

Model Ⅲ: Target Only Factors
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛽1 + 𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝛽2 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝛽3 + 𝜀𝑖

The second set of models evaluated only factors relating to the target. Model Ⅲ
analyzed the impact of global region and industry relation on the CAR. As evident in
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table Ⅷ, neither factor was found to be statistically significant. With a p-value of 0.9, I
found that, relative to the acquired company being headquartered outside of the
Americas, acquisitions of American companies corresponded with a decrease in CAR of
0.14%. With a high p-value, this result rejected Hypothesis 2, which predicted that
acquisitions of international companies related to positive CARs. With a p-value of 0.8, I
also found that, relative to acquisitions in unrelated industries, acquisitions of a company
in the same industry (media) is associated with a decrease in CAR of .22%.

Model Ⅳ: Target Only Factors (including deal price)
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛽1 + 𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝛽2 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝛽3 + 𝐿𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝛽4 + 𝜀𝑖

When considering the deal price factor and decreasing the number of observations
from 195 to 92, interesting results were found. As visible in Table Ⅸ, a target firm’s
location in the Americas was still found to be statistically insignificant from 0 and
associated with a decrease in CAR. Next. At a P < 0.10 level, relative to acquisitions in
unrelated industries, an acquisition of a company in the media industry was associated
with a decrease in CAR of 3.0%. Lastly, the size of the deal was statistically significant at
the 0.05 level, with a 1% increase in deal size corresponding with a predicted increase in
CAR of .73%. These findings hint that acquisitions by media companies are viewed more
negatively by the market than other industries and that larger deals are viewed more
positively.
In addition to running cross-regressions with multiple independent variables, to
test individual target industries on acquiror CAR, univariate regressions were ran with
each individual industry in its dummy variable form. As visible in Table Ⅹ, most
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industries were found to have no statistically significant effect on CAR. Industries that
are very statistically significant (Apparel and Accessories, Commercial Products, Energy
Equipment, and IT Services) should be interpreted warily because each had extremely
small sample sizes (N<4) that overstate regression results. Disregarding significance,
commercial products, commercial services, communications and networking,
restaurants/hotels/leisure, retail, services, and software acquisitions were associated with
a predicted increase in CAR. Some of my Hypothesis 3 was proven true. Though
statistically insignificant, different target company industries yielded different effects on
CARs. Additionally, Software companies were found to have a statistically insignificant
positive effect on CARs.

Model Ⅴ: Acquiror, Target, and Market Factor Model
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛽1 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝛽2 + 𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝛽3 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝛽4 + 𝐿𝑛𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝛽5 +
𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑟𝛽5 + 𝜀𝑖

The third and final model set looked at the impact that all available factors had on
acquirors’ CAR. It incorporated the variables from both Model Ⅰ and Model Ⅲ, while
adding in the time variable “Years”. Therefore, the variables tested were global region,
industry relation, acquiror size, serial acquiror status, and years. Table Ⅺ reveals results
of the regression. The size of the acquiror was the only variable with a statistically
significant impact at the 0.05 level. Holding all else fixed, a 1% change in acquiror size
was associated with a predicted increase in CAR of 0.41%. At a p-value of 0.7, a 1-year
change was associated with a predicted decrease in CAR of 0.04%. With a p-value of
0.9, I found that, relative to the acquired company being headquartered outside of the
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Americas, acquisitions of American companies corresponded with a decrease in CAR of
0.13% (in line with Model Ⅱ). With a p-value of 0.5, I also found that, relative to an
acquisition in an unrelated industry, an acquisition of a company in the same industry
was associated with a decrease in CAR of 0.69% (in line directionally with Model Ⅱ).
Lastly, with a very insignificant p-value of 1.0, relative to non-serial acquirors, being a
serial acquiror was associated with a decrease in CAR of .01%.

Model Ⅵ: Acquiror, Target, and Market Factor Model
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛽1 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝛽2 + 𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝛽3 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝛽4 + 𝐿𝑛𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝛽5 +
𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑟𝛽5 + 𝐿𝑛𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝛽5 + 𝜀𝑖

Slightly different results were found when considering the deal price factor along
with all other variables, visible in Table ⅪⅠ. In this regression, the only statistically
significant results at the 0.05 level was industry relation. Where, relative to non-media
targets, acquisitions of a media target were associated with a predicted decrease in CAR
of 3.5%. This was a similar directional finding as in Model Ⅳ and Ⅴ. The deal size
variable was found to be significant at the 0.20 level, with a 1% change in deal size being
associated with an increase in CAR of .57%. The size of the acquiror and global region
variable had the same directional interpretations as in Model Ⅴ, that excluded deal size.
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Ⅴ. Conclusion and Discussion
This study examines the effect of M&A announcements on cumulative abnormal
returns for acquirors in the media and entertainment industry in the 21st century. Results
were overall consistent with previous literature, finding that acquirors experienced
cumulative abnormal returns that were statistically insignificant from 0, on average. My
analysis hints that the American media and entertainment industry does not have special
dynamics that lead to significant acquiror value creation as a result of a merger or
acquisition.
Although the generation of cumulative abnormal returns yielded statistically
insignificant results, my cross-regression analysis did find some significant findings. My
primary finding, detailed in Table Ⅺ, was that an increase in acquiror enterprise value
was associated with a predicted increase in CAR, leading me to reject Hypothesis 6. This
result contradicts the findings of Moeller et al. (2003) that found large acquirors have
average announcement returns that are 2% less than small acquirors’. One possible
interpretation for this finding is that the entertainment industry is uniquely structured so
that larger firms are generally viewed more positively than smaller firms. Because the
barriers to entry are so high for companies like movie studios or movie theater chains, the
market is dominated by a few big players that elbow each other out for small market
share increases. These few top players, like AMC and ViacomCBS, then experience a
more positive market reaction compared to smaller players.
Next, I discovered interesting results surrounding the effect of industry on CAR.
Media, which was the most common target industry, yielded a large (3.5%) statistically
significant negative effect on CAR in Model Ⅵ. This finding supported Hypothesis 3:
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that acquired media companies would generate negative or zero returns, on average. One
possible interpretation of this is that the market negatively views the movies, music, and
entertainment industry as a whole. Given business models that are tied to consumer
trends and artistic preferences, the cash flows and stability of businesses in this industry
are likely to be more volatile. By acquiring companies in this media space rather than
more predictable industries like those in the restaurant or commercial services space, the
acquiror takes on more risk that may lead to negative returns around the announcement
date.
The other 3 most common industries for acquisitions, Commercial Services,
Restaurants/Hotels/Leisure, and Software yielded a (statistically insignificant) positive
effect on CAR. A larger sample of software acquisitions may have had a statistically
significant effect, as predicted by Hypothesis 3. Overall, software may have a more
positive market reaction due to digitization trends and the increasing importance of topnotch software in the highly competitive entertainment industry.
The Commercial Services M&A market is dominated by Live Nation
Entertainment with 34 of the 51 acquisitions (67%). A majority of the acquisitions are
focused on event management services or companies that expanded digital service
offerings such as marketing or staffing. Acquisitions of companies in this space are likely
more attractive given their tech-enabled services and geographic synergies that are
generally easier to integrate compared to other growth or cost cutting rationales for
acquisitions. The restaurants, hotels, and leisure acquisitions vary greatly in target
business model. There is a fairly even combination of restaurants, hotels, and film-related
companies. A positive CAR in these industries could be reflective of the generally
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positive view of the tourism industry during the time of the acquisition. The rest of the
industries examined had a very small number of acquisitions, meaning that drawing clear
rationales is likely a fool’s errand.
Another interesting finding from my study was that the deal price corresponded
with a predicted increase in CAR at P < 0.10 level (visible in Table ⅪⅠ), which would
signal rejection of Hypothesis 4. This contrasted what Dong et al. (2002) found when
looking at public to public transactions, where higher target valuations led to use of more
stock, which in turn led to lower returns around the announcement date. One possible
explanation is that acquisitions of private firms using equity does not decrease abnormal
returns. This finding is supported by Chang (1998) which found that private firms
acquired with stock between 1981 and 1992 had positive abnormal returns and Fuller et
al. (2002) that found that acquisitions of private firms from 1990 to 2000 realized
positive abnormal returns on average, regardless of method of payment. These studies
provide evidence that private target firms spur different market reactions than public
targets. For additional reasoning why an increase in deal price may correspond with an
increase in CAR, it is possible that the market had a non-zero reaction because the bigger
target companies were more well-known private companies that spurred a specific
investor reaction.
When examining the impact of global region, I found contradicting findings in the
literature. My results indicated that acquisitions of American companies corresponded
with a (statistically insignificant) increase in CAR, relative to acquisitions of international
companies, leading me to reject Hypothesis 2. One reason for this could be limitations of
data, with only 58 international acquisitions utilized. Another explanation could be
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specific to the media and entertainment industry. Purchasing international content or
entertainment services may be viewed either negatively or agnostically by the United
States market due to unfamiliarity and unpopularity of foreign media in the US.
Next, I found that there was no effect of time on CAR, supporting my Hypothesis
7. Even when split into 4 even time period quartiles, all results were statistically
insignificant. The first, second, and fourth time periods yielded (statistically insignificant)
negative relationships with CARs. Surprisingly, the third quartile had a positive
(statistically insignificant) relationship with CAR. A possible explanation for this is the
market rebound following the 2007-2009 recession. Views of the market were generally
very bullish and contributed to positive CARs for media companies during this time
period.
Lastly, my results found that there was no statistically significant relationship
between serial acquirors and CAR, relative to non-serial acquirors. This finding rejected
my Hypothesis 5. This finding would suggest that very acquisitive companies don’t earn
a financial benefit from acquisitions. Looking deeper at the data, the most acquisitive
companies, Disney and Live Nation Entertainment, both had an overall negative average
CAR when considering all acquisitions. Assuming that these companies have intelligent
management, the firm must see value in acquisitions beyond their effect on short-term
stock market returns.
In conclusion, my study found that, on average, abnormal returns for acquiror’s in
the media and entertainment space are not statistically different from zero. Additionally, I
found that acquiror size and acquisitions of media companies had a significant impact on
acquiror returns.
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Ⅵ. Limitations & Suggestions for Future Research
My research and findings gave rise to a number of interesting questions that that
would be helpful to study further. Additionally, there were a variety of limitations that
must be acknowledged when considering my results. First, my data was limited, with my
models having a number of observations of 92 or 195. This small sample size could have
skewed the findings or led to possible insignificance that would change given a larger
data set. Second, I focused on a very specific subset of the media and entertainment
industry: companies in the movies, music, and entertainment sub-sector, as categorized
by Pitchbook. No public acquiror in this space was found to acquire a public target. In
future research, it would be helpful to measure a combined cumulative abnormal return
(including the target) to get a fuller picture of the true wealth creation of the acquisition.
Next, my study utilized Pitchbook data as the main source. My research was
therefore limited to what is available on that particular database. In future research on
acquiror returns around an announcement, different factors would be interesting to study.
For example, data on how the deal was financed, the specific strategy of the deal, and
target financial data information may have an impact on the average CAR. Additionally,
due to cost constraints, I was unable to download more than one data set, which limited
possible number of observations because I could not re-download and complete the same
analysis on a larger data set. Lastly, my research focused on a market measure to judge
the value created by the merger, the cumulative abnormal return. For one, this measure
assumes the efficient market hypothesis to be true. Also, there are other non-market ways
to assess an acquisition such as accounting, operational, or qualitative analysis. Future
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studies would benefit from considering the limitations of this study and expanding upon
the research undertaken.
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Ⅶ. Appendix
Table Ⅰ. Acquisitions by Acquiror
Company Ticker
AMC
AMCX
AVID
CIDM
CNK
CSSE
DIS
EB
FOXA
GAIA
IAC
IHRT
IMBI
LYV
MCS
NCMI
NFLX
SAPX
TIXC
UEIC
VIAC
VVI
WMG
WWE
Total

Number of Acquisitions
5
6
14
6
4
3
38
1
1
7
4
1
1
63
2
1
3
2
1
5
7
12
6
2
195

% of Total
3%
3%
7%
3%
2%
2%
19%
1%
1%
4%
2%
1%
1%
32%
1%
1%
2%
1%
1%
3%
4%
6%
3%
1%
100%

Table Ⅰ displays the total number of acquisitions by acquiror between 2000 and 2020.
With only 24 acquirors, its apparent that very few firms are acquisitive in the movies,
music, and entertainment space. Additionally, the table shows that a few major players
are highly acquisitive, with the top two most acquisitive companies (LYV and DIS)
accounting for over 50% of total deal volume in the time period.
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Table Ⅱ. Acquisitions by Industry
Target Industry
Apparel and Accessories
Capital Markets/Institutions
Commercial Products
Commercial Services
Communications and Networking
Computer Hardware
Consumer Durables
Energy Equipment
IT Services
Media
Restaurants, Hotels, and Leisure
Retail
Services (Non-Financial)
Software
Total

Number of Acquisitions
2
1
3
51
3
1
4
2
1
73
13
4
4
33
195

% of Total
1%
1%
2%
26%
2%
1%
2%
1%
1%
37%
7%
2%
2%
17%
100%

Table Ⅱ displays the total number of acquisitions made by a media company in each
industry between 2000 and 2020. Media was the space with the most acquisitions, with
commercial services coming in second, software in third; and restaurants, hotels, and
leisure in fourth. The table shows that media companies acquire a diverse set of
companies.

Global Region
Africa
Americas
Asia
Europe
Middle East
Oceania
Total

Table Ⅲ. Acquisitions by Region
Number of Acquisitions
1
137
8
45
2
2
195

% of Total
1%
70%
4%
23%
1%
1%
100%

Table Ⅲ displays the total number of acquisitions made by a media company in each
region between 2000 and 2020. Most target companies were headquartered in the
Americas (70%). The only other sizable region was Europe, with 45 acquisitions in the
time period (23%).
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Chart Ⅰ. Number of Media Acquisitions Per Year
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Chart Ⅰ displays the total number of yearly acquisitions made by a media company
between 2000 and 2020. There is a general increase in deal volume in the space. From
2000 to 2004 there were only 9 acquisitions, compared with 76 acquisitions from 2016 to
2020. This increase in deal volume in the movies, music, and entertainment sub-sector
was a large motivator for this study.

Table Ⅳ. Cumulative Abnormal Returns (Daily) 5
Day Relative to Event

CAR

-2
-1
0
1
2

-0.0032
-0.0042
-0.0049
-0.0050
-0.0059

T-Stat
(-2.00)***
(-1.62)**
(-1.76)**
(-1.31)*
(-1.37)*

Table Ⅳ displays the acquirors’ average daily cumulative abnormal returns for the data
set described and an event window of [-2,2], with N=195. The cumulative abnormal
returns were derived from the Fama French Three Factor Model Plus Momentum
(Carhart (1997)). The total cumulative abnormal return 2 days after announcement was
found to be -0.59% with a t-stat of -1.37. This result leads to the conclusion that, on
average, acquirors do not earn an abnormal return that is statically significant from 0 at
the 0.05 level.
5

P>|t| 0.20 = *, P>|t| = 0.10 = **, P>|t| = 0.05 = ***, P>|t| = 0.01 = ****
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Chart Ⅱ. Event Study Results for [-2,2] Event Window

Chart Ⅱ displays the acquirors average daily cumulative abnormal returns for the data set
described and an event window of [-2,2], with N=195, graphically. Results show the
gradual negative trend from 2 days before the announcement to 2 days following.
Chart Ⅲ. Event Study Results for [-10,10] Event Window
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Chart Ⅲ displays the acquirors average daily cumulative abnormal returns for the data set
described and an event window of [-10,10], with N=195, graphically. Results show the
gradual negative trend from 10 days before the announcement to 10 days following.
There was a brief positive bump between 10 days before announcement to 8 days before
announcement. This bump may be evidence of the insider trading hypothesis.

Table Ⅴ. Dummy Variable Assignments for Cross-Sectional Regressions
Variable

Di = 1

Di = 0

Global Region
Serial Acquiror
Industry Relation

Americas
5 or More Acquisitions
Media

Other
4 or Less Acquisitions
All Others

Table Ⅴ displays the variables that were assigned dummy variables utilized in my
regression analysis. The first column shows the variable name. The second column shows
the categorization of the variable that was given the value of 1. The final column shows
the categorization of the variable that was given the value of 0, making the variable
binary.

Table Ⅵ. Impact of Acquiror Factors on Acquirors’ CAR6
Independent Variable
Ln Acquiror Size
Serial Acquiror

β
(t-stat)
0.0037465
(1.81)**
0.0027439
(0.21)

Std Error
0.0020697
0.0129824

Table Ⅵ displays the results of Model Ⅰ, the first regression of acquiror factors on
cumulative abnormal returns (N=195). The model evaluated how acquiror size (natural
logged for interpretation) and serial acquiror status affected cumulative abnormal returns
of the acquiror. Acquiror size was found to have a statistically significant positive effect
on CAR at the 0.10 level, whereas serial acquiror status was not found to be statistically
significant from 0.
6

P>|t| 0.20 = *, P>|t| = 0.10 = **, P>|t| = 0.05 = ***, P>|t| = 0.01 = ****
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Table Ⅶ. Impact of Acquiror Factors on Acquirors’ CAR (including Deal
Size)
β
Independent Variable
Std Error
(t-stat)
Ln Acquiror Size
0.0014441
0.0040471
(0.36)
Serial Acquiror
0.0014925
0.021005
(0.07)
Ln Deal Price
0.0042055
0.0043117
(0.98)
Table Ⅶ displays the results of Model Ⅱ, the second regression of acquiror factors on
cumulative abnormal returns (N=92). The model evaluated how acquiror size (natural
logged for interpretation), serial acquiror status, and deal price (natural logged for
interpretation) affected cumulative abnormal returns of the acquiror. None of the results
were found to be statistically significant from 0 in this model.

Table Ⅷ. Impact of Target Factors on Acquirors’ CAR
Independent Variable
Global Region
Industry Relation

β
(t-stat)
-0.0014052
(-0.15)
-0.0021546
(-0.24)

Std Error
0.0095123
0.008985

Table Ⅷ displays the results of Model Ⅲ, the first regression of target factors on
cumulative abnormal returns (N=195). The model evaluated how target headquarters
region and industry relation to the acquiror affected cumulative abnormal returns of the
acquiror. None of the results were found to be statistically significant from 0 in this
model.
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Table Ⅸ. Impact of Target Factors on Acquirors’ CAR7 (including Deal
Size)
β
Independent Variable
Std Error
(t-stat)
Global Region
-0.0065305
0.0183146
(-0.36)
Industry Relation
-0.0298785
0.0163628
(-1.83)**
Ln Deal Price
0.0073497
0.0037325
(1.97)***
Table Ⅸ displays the results of Model Ⅳ, the second regression of target factors on
cumulative abnormal returns (N=92). The model evaluated how target headquarters
region, industry relation to the acquiror, and deal price (natural logged for interpretation)
affected cumulative abnormal returns of the acquiror. At the 0.10 level, relative to an
acquisition in an unrelated industry, an acquisition of a company in the same industry
(media) was associated with a decrease in CAR of 3.0%. Also, at the 0.05 level, a 1%
increase in deal price corresponded with a predicted increase in CAR of .73%. Global
region was not found to be statistically significant from 0.

7

P>|t| 0.20 = *, P>|t| = 0.10 = **, P>|t| = 0.05 = ***, P>|t| = 0.01 = ****
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Table Ⅹ. Impact of Target Industry on Acquirors’ CAR8
β
Independent Variable
Std Error
(t-stat)
Media
-0.0021765
0.008961
(-0.24)
Apparel and Accessories
-0.1004317
0.0424382
(-2.37)***
Capital Markets/Institutions
-0.0370695
0.0606655
(-0.61)
Commercial Products
0.0527431
0.0350361
(1.51)*
Commercial Services
0.0059328
0.0098603
(0.60)
Communications and Networking
0.004254
0.0352399
(0.12)
Computer Hardware
-0.0523311
0.0606072
(-0.86)
Consumer Durables
-0.0297629
0.0305245
(-0.98)
Energy Equipment
-0.0685162
0.0427661
(-1.60)*
IT Services
-0.1583941
0.0596442
(-2.66)****
Restaurants Hotels and Leisure
0.0068035
0.0173813
(0.39)
Retail
0.0117229
0.0305879
(0.38)
Services (Non-Financial)
0.0024251
0.0305991
(0.08)
Software
0.009746
0.0115464
(0.84)
Table Ⅹ displays the results of separate univariate regressions evaluating the effect of
target company industry on cumulative abnormal returns (N=195). Each β coefficient
represents a regression where the industry variable listed was a dummy variable, with
being in that industry given a value of 1 and not being in the industry given a value of 0.
Therefore, each result should be interpreted as “relative to all other industries, an
acquisition in this industry is associated with a predicted change in CAR”. The regression
aims to answer questions surrounding how acquisitions in different industries are valued.
The only results that were statistically significant from 0 had N<4, so interpretations
should be cautious given small sample size.
8

P>|t| 0.20 = *, P>|t| = 0.10 = **, P>|t| = 0.05 = ***, P>|t| = 0.01 = ****
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Table Ⅺ. Impact of Acquiror, Target, & Market Factors on Acquirors’
CAR9
β
Independent Variable
Std Error
(t-stat)
Years
-0.000434
0.0008857
(-0.49)
Global Region
-0.0013061
0.010114
(-0.13)
Industry Relation
-0.0069297
0.0094557
(-0.73)
Ln Acquiror Size
0.0041363
0.0021359
(-1.94)***
Serial Acquiror
-0.0001248
0.0139131
(-0.01)
Table Ⅺ displays the results of Model Ⅴ, the first regression of all factors on cumulative
abnormal returns (N=195). The model evaluated how years, target headquarters region,
industry relation to the acquiror, acquiror size (natural logged for interpretation), and
serial acquiror status affected cumulative abnormal returns of the acquiror. At the 0.05
level, a 1% increase in acquiror size corresponded with a predicted increase in CAR of
.41%. All other variables were not found to be statistically significant from 0 in this
model.
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Table Ⅻ. Impact of Acquiror, Target, & Market Factors on Acquiror’s
CAR (Including Deal Size) 10
β
Independent Variable
Std Error
(t-stat)
Years
0.0006419
0.0015422
(0.42)
Global Region
-0.0059739
0.0193536
(-0.31)
Industry Relation
-0.035412
0.0173811
(-2.04)***
Ln Acquiror Size
0.0034839
0.0041742
(0.83)
Serial Acquiror
0.0036245
0.0226823
(0.16)
Ln Deal Price
0.0057872
0.0043749
(1.32)*
Table Ⅻ displays the results of Model Ⅵ, the second regression of all factors on
cumulative abnormal returns (N=92). The model evaluated how years, target
headquarters region, industry relation to the acquiror, acquiror size (natural logged for
interpretation), serial acquiror status, and deal price (natural logged for interpretation)
affected cumulative abnormal returns of the acquiror. At the 0.05 level, relative to nonmedia targets, acquisitions of a media target were associated with a predicted decrease in
CAR of 3.5%. The deal price variable was found to be significant at the 0.20 level, with a
1% change in deal price being associated with an increase in CAR of .57%.
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P>|t| 0.20 = *, P>|t| = 0.10 = **, P>|t| = 0.05 = ***, P>|t| = 0.01 = ****
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Table ⅫⅠ. Deal List (N=195)
Acquiror

Target

Announcement
Date

AMC Theatres (NYS: AMC)

Starplex Cinemas

14-Jul-2015

AMC Theatres (NYS: AMC)

Carmike Cinemas

03-Mar-2016

AMC Theatres (NYS: AMC)

ODEON Cinemas

12-May-2016

AMC Theatres (NYS: AMC)

Nordic Cinema Group

AMC Theatres (NYS: AMC)

Cinetopia

AMC Networks (NAS: AMCX)

Chellomedia

AMC Networks (NAS: AMCX)

RLJ Entertainment

26-Feb-2018

AMC Networks (NAS: AMCX)

Levity Entertainment Group

20-Apr-2018

AMC Networks (NAS: AMCX)

IKO Media Group (Film+)

02-Feb-2015

AMC Networks (NAS: AMCX)

Kinowelt Television

24-Apr-2014

AMC Networks (NAS: AMCX)

Riverwood Studios

04-Aug-2017

Avid Technology (NAS: AVID)

Blue Order Technologies Solutions

05-Jan-2010

Avid Technology (NAS: AVID)

Euphonix

12-Apr-2010

Avid Technology (NAS: AVID)

Maximum Throughput

Avid Technology (NAS: AVID)

Medéa Corporation

Avid Technology (NAS: AVID)

M-Audio

20-Aug-2004

Avid Technology (NAS: AVID)

Sundance Digital

13-Apr-2006

Avid Technology (NAS: AVID)

NxN Digital Entertainment

02-Jan-2004

Avid Technology (NAS: AVID)

Pluto Technologies International

07-Sep-2000

Avid Technology (NAS: AVID)

Sibelius Software

02-Aug-2006

Avid Technology (NAS: AVID)

Wizoo Sound Design

22-Aug-2005

Avid Technology (NAS: AVID)

Pinnacle Systems

09-Aug-2005

Avid Technology (NAS: AVID)

Rocket Network

04-Apr-2003

Avid Technology (NAS: AVID)

iKnowledge

29-Oct-2002

Avid Technology (NAS: AVID)

The Motion Factory

29-Jun-2000

Cinedigm (NAS: CIDM)

Gaiam Vivendi Entertainment

17-Oct-2013

Cinedigm (NAS: CIDM)

New Video Group

19-Apr-2012

Cinedigm (NAS: CIDM)

The Film Detective

19-Oct-2020

Cinedigm (NAS: CIDM)

ComicBlitz

28-Nov-2018

Cinedigm (NAS: CIDM)

StoryBox.tv

18-May-2016

Cinedigm (NAS: CIDM)

Viewster

10-Dec-2018

Cinemark Theatres (NYS: CNK)

Circuito Espaço de Cinema

09-Apr-2018

Cinemark Theatres (NYS: CNK)

Hoyts General Cinema South America

25-Aug-2011

Cinemark Theatres (NYS: CNK)

Sea Turtle Cinemas

03-May-2011

Cinemark Theatres (NYS: CNK)

Rave Cinemas

16-Nov-2012

Chicken Soup for the Soul Entertainment (NAS:
CSSE)
Chicken Soup for the Soul Entertainment (NAS:
CSSE)

Truli Media Group (OTC: TRLI)

25-Oct-2018

Pivotshare

14-Aug-2018

23-Jan-2017
23-May-2019
28-Oct-2013

31-Jul-2009
12-Jan-2006
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Chicken Soup for the Soul Entertainment (NAS:
CSSE)
The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)

Crackle

14-May-2019

US Weekly

28-Feb-2001

The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)

Fox Family Worldwide

24-Oct-2001

The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)

The Baby Einstein Company

06-Nov-2001

The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)

Avalanche Software

01-Apr-2005

The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)

Mind Eye Productions

The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)

Pixar

The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)

United Home Entertainment

The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)

Mobile2win China

The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)

Black Rock Studio

28-Sep-2006

The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)

Enorbus Technologies

19-Mar-2007

The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)

Junction Point Studios

12-Jul-2007

The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)

Club Penguin Island

The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)

Iparenting

04-Dec-2007

The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)

26-Mar-2008

The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)

The Walt Disney (Disney Store North
America)
Ideal Bite

The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)

FanLib

02-Sep-2008

The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)

UTV Software Communications

29-Sep-2008

The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)

DigiSynd

20-Oct-2008

The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)

Kerpoof

20-Feb-2009

The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)

Amazingmoms.com

01-Apr-2009

The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)

Marvel Entertainment

31-Dec-2009

The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)

The Disney Store Japan

31-Mar-2010

The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)

Tapulous

The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)

Playdom

The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)

Togetherville

23-Feb-2011

The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)

Rocket Pack

03-Mar-2011

The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)

Babble

14-Nov-2011

The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)

One True Media

01-Jun-2012

The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)

Das Vierte

24-Sep-2012

The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)

Studio Ex

10-Dec-2012

The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)

Lucasfilm

31-October-2012

The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)

Maker Studios

25-Mar-2014

The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)

Euro Disney

06-Oct-2014

The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)

MakieLab

01-Jul-2016

The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)

BamTech

08-Aug-2017

The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)

SportsTime Ohio

05-Dec-2017

The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)

21st Century Fox

20-Jun-2018

The Walt Disney Company (NYS: DIS)

Fox Sports Mexico

20-Mar-2019

Eventbrite (NYS: EB)

ToneDen

16-Nov-2020

Fox Corporation (NAS: FOXA)(Lachlan Murdoch)

Tubi (Movies, Music and Entertainment)

17-Mar-2020

08-Jun-2005
05-May-2006
26-Jul-2006
06-Mar-2006

01-Aug-2007

12-Jun-2008

01-Jul-2010
27-Jul-2010
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Gaia (Colorado) (NAS: GAIA)

Fresh Eye Productions

08-Nov-2013

Gaia (Colorado) (NAS: GAIA)

GoodTimes Brands Holdings

30-Sep-2005

Gaia (Colorado) (NAS: GAIA)

SPRI Products

10-Mar-2008

Gaia (Colorado) (NAS: GAIA)

Conscious Enlightenment

02-Jul-2007

Gaia (Colorado) (NAS: GAIA)

Real Goods Trading

02-Jan-2001

Gaia (Colorado) (NAS: GAIA)

Zaadz

06-Aug-2007

Gaia (Colorado) (NAS: GAIA)

Yoga Studio

16-Oct-2014

IAC (NAS: IAC)

Vivian Health

26-Jun-2019

IAC (NAS: IAC)

Bluecrew

26-Feb-2018

IAC (NAS: IAC)

Care.com

20-Dec-2019

IAC (NAS: IAC)

TelTech Systems

01-Oct-2018

iHeartMedia (NAS: IHRT)(Robert Pittman)

Voxnest

22-Oct-2020

iMedia Brands (NAS: IMBI)

J.W. Hulme

26-Nov-2019

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

Musictoday

31-Jul-2006

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

HOB Entertainment

06-Nov-2006

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

Live Nation Espana

19-Dec-2006

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

TRUNK

27-Apr-2007

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

Bamboozle Festival

04-Sep-2007

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

Anthill Trading

31-Oct-2007

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

Live Nation Merchandise

15-Nov-2007

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

DF Concerts & Events

10-Apr-2008

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

Live Nation Middle East FZ

15-Feb-2008

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

Lugerinc

17-Jun-2008

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

Ticketmaster Entertainment

02-Jan-2009

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

Ticketmaster International

09-Nov-2010

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

Front Line Management Companies

07-Feb-2011

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

BigChampagne Media Measurement

14-Dec-2011

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

Setlist.fm

06-Mar-2012

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

Michael Coppel Presents

04-Apr-2012

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

Cream Holdings

09-May-2012

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

HARD Events

26-Jun-2012

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

Rexly

16-Jul-2012

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

Maverick Management

02-Jan-2013

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

Insomniac Events

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

BDG Music Group

19-Jun-2013

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

Ticketnet Belgium

21-Oct-2013

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

Sherpa.be

09-Sep-2014

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

C3 Presents

06-Oct-2014

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

Starr Hill Presents

12-Jan-2015

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

Front Gate Tickets

09-Jun-2015

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

Mama & Company

07-Aug-2014

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

Arts Club

11-Aug-2015

02-May-2013
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Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

InDMusic

16-Feb-2016

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

Big Concerts International Proprietary

22-Feb-2016

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

Founders Entertainment

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

GreenLight Media and Marketing

04-May-2016

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

Nous Productions

01-Aug-2016

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

AC Entertainment

31-Oct-2016

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

Sweden Rock Festival

22-Nov-2016

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

Secret Sounds Connect

05-Dec-2016

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

Pristine Alpine Entertainment

03-Jan-2017

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

Bottlerock

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

Isle of Wight Festival

17-Mar-2017

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

United Concerts

04-Oct-2017

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

Big Loud Management

09-Nov-2017

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

Frank Productions

11-Jan-2018

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

Songkick

12-Jan-2018

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

Soda Jerk Presents

09-Jan-2018

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

Wolfson Entertainment

05-Apr-2018

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

ScoreMore (concert promoters)

30-May-2018

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

Red Mountain Entertainment

27-Jun-2018

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

DF Entertainment

20-Dec-2018

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

ONE Production

28-Jan-2019

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

Embrace Presents

05-Feb-2019

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

Planet Events

06-Feb-2019

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

Neste Live

12-Feb-2019

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

Blockfest

15-Feb-2019

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

Tons of Rock

21-Feb-2019

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

Levitate Music and Arts Festival

25-Apr-2019

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

PDH Music

14-May-2019

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

Spaceland Presents

17-May-2019

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

Go Ahead

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

OCESA

25-Jul-2019

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

Hög Agency

02-Oct-2019

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

Groot Hospitality

21-Oct-2019

Live Nation Entertainment (NYS: LYV)

Bergen Live

28-Feb-2020

The Marcus Corporation (NYS: MCS)

Safe House

The Marcus Corporation (NYS: MCS)

Wyndham Milwaukee Center Hotel

27-May-2005

National Cinemedia (NAS: NCMI)

Fantasy Movie League

17-May-2017

Netflix (NAS: NFLX)

ABQ studios

19-Nov-2018

Netflix (NAS: NFLX)

StoryBots

09-May-2019

Netflix (NAS: NFLX)

Millarworld

07-Aug-2017

Wireless Connect (PINX: SAPX)

Big Jake Music

23-Aug-2011

Wireless Connect (PINX: SAPX)

Seven Arts Filmed Entertainment Louisiana

21-March-2016

13-Jan-2017

03-Jun-2019

15-Jun-2015

02-Jul-2012
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Tix (PINX: TIXC)

All Access Entertainment

02-Mar-2010

Universal Electronics (NAS: UEIC)

Enson Assets

04-Nov-2010

Universal Electronics (NAS: UEIC)

Ecolink Intelligent Technology

06-Aug-2015

Universal Electronics (NAS: UEIC)

RCS Technology

06-Apr-2017

Universal Electronics (NAS: UEIC)

Zilog (Remote Control Software)

01-Feb-2018

Universal Electronics (NAS: UEIC)

Simpledevices

04-Oct-2004

ViacomCBS (NAS: VIAC)

Wallstrip.com

21-May-2007

ViacomCBS (NAS: VIAC)

CSTV Networks

04-Nov-2005

ViacomCBS (NAS: VIAC)

CBS Outernet

06-Sep-2007

ViacomCBS (NAS: VIAC)

Ananey Communications

06-Apr-2020

ViacomCBS (NAS: VIAC)

The Insider

10-Oct-2007

ViacomCBS (NAS: VIAC)

Last.fm

30-May-2007

ViacomCBS (NAS: VIAC)

MaxPreps

04-Apr-2007

Viad (NYS: VVI)

Esja Attractions

03-Nov-2017

Viad (NYS: VVI)

ON Services

11-Aug-2016

Viad (NYS: VVI)

N200

24-Nov-2014

Viad (NYS: VVI)

Resource Creative

19-Feb-2013

Viad (NYS: VVI)

Becker Group

04-Jan-2008

Viad (NYS: VVI)

FlyOver Canada

29-Dec-2016

Viad (NYS: VVI)

Alaska Collection

11-Mar-2016

Viad (NYS: VVI)

Maligne Tours

04-Jan-2016

Viad (NYS: VVI)

West Glacier Motel & Cabins

01-Jul-2014

Viad (NYS: VVI)

Banff International Hotel

07-Mar-2012

Viad (NYS: VVI)

Travel Technology Group

07-Oct-2014

Viad (NYS: VVI)

Mountain Park Lodges

10-Jun-2019

Warner Music Group (NAS: WMG)

Mariann Grammofon

19-May-2006

Warner Music Group (NAS: WMG)

The Rights Company

28-Nov-2006

Warner Music Group (NAS: WMG)

Zebralution

22-Jan-2007

Warner Music Group (NAS: WMG)

Base Camp Productions

02-Jan-2009

Warner Music Group (NAS: WMG)

Frank Sinatra Enterprises

19-Nov-2009

Warner Music Group (NAS: WMG)

Artist Arena

04-Jan-2010

World Wrestling Entertainment (NYS: WWE)

EVOLVE Wrestling

02-Jul-2020

World Wrestling Entertainment (NYS: WWE)

Universal Wrestling Archives

11-Jun-2012
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